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McKay: Workers' Compensation

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SUSPENDING AND
TERMINATING TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS

In Grayson v. CarterRhoad Furniture'the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that when an employer seeks to suspend temporary total disability (TTD)
benefits pursuant to Regulation 67-504,2 the employer must provide clear
proof of the employee's ability to return to work "without restriction."' The
court found that Carter Rhoad could not have properly terminated Grayson's
TTD benefits because it failed to meet the preliminary requirements for
suspension of benefits under Regulation 67-504(C). Although the court focused
on Regulation 67-504, the Grayson decision raises questions about the
necessary degree of proof that employers and carriers must provide pursuant
to other regulations as well.
Grayson worked as a furniture mover for Carter Rhoad Furniture and
injured his back while moving a sofa on August 23, 1990. 4 Grayson continued
working until October 9, 1990 when he was forced to stop because of
increased pain.5 On December 11, 1990, Dr. Joel Graziano, an orthopaedic
surgeon, reported that Grayson was "doing fine"6 and told Grayson that he

1.

__

S.C.

_,

454 S.E.2d 320 (1995).

2. See 25A S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 67-504 (Law. Co-op. 1990). The practitioner is advised
to be aware of recent statutory revisions. Specifically, S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-260(B)(1) to (6)
(1996) (effective June 18, 1996) is worth noting:
The revised statute allows an employer to initiate payment of temporary benefits
once an employee has missed eight consecutive days due to a reported work-related
injury, without admitting the claim. Now, an employer may stop or suspend payment
of temporary benefits for up to 150 days after the injury is reported, without a
hearing, based on any one of the [six reasons set forth in § 42-9-260(B)(1) to (6)].
After the initial 150 days, the new legislation calls for the Commission to
implement a regulation, rather than the existing rule, to provide the method and
procedure for employers to stop payment. The new regulation is likely to mirror the
present rule, as a the new legislation left unchanged the requirment for an evidentiary
hearing and Commission approval prior to terminating benefits.
... [H]owever .... an employer [can] stop payment, without a hearing, after

the 150 days expires, if the basis for the stop payment is either § 42-9-260(B)(1) or
(2).
Alton L. Martin, Understanding the New Workers' Compensation Legislation, S.C. LAW.,
Sept./Oct. 1996, at 15, 16-17.
454 S.E.2d at 322.
S.C. at _,
3. Grayson, _
, 454 S.E.2d at 321.
4. Id. at
, 454 S.E.2d at 321.
5. Id. at

6. Record at 52.
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could return to work the following Monday. Dr. Graziano added, however,
that Grayson "should be somewhat careful with lifting, etc." 7 Carter Rhoad
paid Grayson TTD benefits while he was out of work until December 16,
1990.8 Grayson returned to work on December 17, 1990 and "worked in pain
for three weeks. "9 On January 7, 1991 Carter Rhoad fired Grayson, alleging
Grayson's lack of a driver's license as the grounds for termination.'o Grayson
then initiated an action to resume TTD payments."
The Single Commissioner held that Grayson failed to prove he was
entitled to further TTD benefits, and the Full Commission affirmed this
decision.' 2 The circuit court reversed, stating that Dr. Graziano's report was
insufficient to constitute the substantial evidence13 necessary to support the
termination of TTD benefits. 4 The court of appeals affirmed, and the
supreme court granted certiorari. 5
The supreme court strictly interpreted Regulation 67-504 and found that
Carter Rhoad failed to provide any proof "that Grayson's period of temporary
total disability ever ended."' 6 The court refused to find Dr. Graziano's
conditional release of Grayson sufficient to constitute evidence that Grayson
could return to work "without restriction."' 7 Additionally, the court found
that Grayson himself had not agreed that he was able to return to work without
restriction despite his having returned to work for three weeks and having
signed a Form 17, Receipt for Compensation. 8 The court, therefore, found

7. Id.; Grayson, _ S.C. at _, 454 S.E.2d at 321.
8. See Brief of Appellant to court of appeals at 2.
9. Grayson, _ S.C. at _, 454 S.E.2d at 321.
10. Id. at __ n.1, 454 S.E.2d at 321 n.1.
11. Id. at_, 454 S.E.2d at 321.
12. Id. at _, 454 S.E.2d at 321.
13. In Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981), the court declared that the
South Carolina Industrial Commission, now the Workers' Compensation Commission, is an
agency governed by the Administrative Procedures Act; therefore, the court replaced the "any
evidence" test with the "substantial evidence test," stating that a reviewing court must uphold the
Commission's findings as to questions of fact, unless those findings prejudice the appellant and
are clearly erroneous when considering the "reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record." Id. at 133, 276 S.E.2d at 305 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(g) (Law Coop. 1976)).
S.C. at _, 454 S.E.2d at 321.
14. Grayson, _
15. Id. at_, 454 S.E.2d at 321. Although the supreme court affirmed the court of appeals
decision, it also modified the opinion, finding there was "no evidence that Grayson's period of
temporary total disability ever ended," rather than upholding the court of appeals determination
that "the commission's findings were based upon a 'mistaken' or 'clearly erroneous' view of the
,454 S.E.2d at 322.
evidence." Id. at
, 454 S.E.2d at 322.
16. Id. at
454 S.E.2d at 322.
17. Id. at
18. Id. at __ n.2, 454 S.E.2d at 322 n.2.
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that Carter Rhoad had improperly terminated TTD payments in violation of
Regulation 67-504. 19

Pursuant to section 42-9-10 of the South Carolina Code, "[w]hen the
incapacity for work resulting from an injury is total, the employer shall pay,
or cause to be paid .. to the injured employee during the total disability a
weekly compensation." 2' The purpose of TTD payments is to compensate the
injured employee for his period of "disability," meaning his "incapacity
because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the
time of [the] injury in the same or any other employment." 2' Generally, the
employee's disability is statutorily "presumed to continue until the employee
is able to return to work without restriction for fifteen calendar days or fifteen
calendar days from the date the claimant agrees he or she was able to return
to work."22 Under Regulation 67-504, in a voluntary suspension of benefits
action, an employer's insurance carrier cannot suspend payments of TTD
unless the "claimant reaches maximum medical improvement' and the
authorized health care provider reports the claimant is able to return to work
without restriction to the same job or other suitable job, and such job is
provided by the employer, or the claimant agrees he or she is able to return
to work without restriction. "24 In contrast, under Regulation 67-507 in an

19. Grayson, _ S.C. at _,
454 S.E.2d at 322.
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-120 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Compare the above rationale for'TTD
with that in Watson v. Winston-Salem TransitAuthority, 374 S.E.2d 483, 486 (N.C. Ct. App.
1988), in which the court of appeals focused on Professor Larson's two-pronged definition of
disability in interpreting the meaning of the North Carolina disability statute, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-2(9) (1988), which mirrors South Carolina Code section 42-1-120:
mhedisability conceptisablend of two ingredients ... :[t]he first ... is disability
in the medical or physical sense ... ; the second ... is defacto inability to earn
wages .... A claimant may be, in a medical sense, utterly shattered and ruined, but
may by sheer determination and ingenuity contrive to make a living for himself;
conversely, a claimant may be able to work, in both his and the doctor's opinion, but
awareness of his injury may lead employers to refuse him employment. These two
illustrations will expose at once the error that results from an uncompromising
preoccupation with either the medical or the actual wage-loss aspect of disability.
Arguably, the court in Grayson could have been emphasizing Grayson's own testimony in
order to prevent an over-reliance on his Form 17 and the wage earning component of disability;
however, the court failed to make any such indication.
22. 25A S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 67-504(B) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
23. See O'Banner v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., __ S.C. _,
,459 S.E.2d 324, 327 (Ct.
App. 1995) (defining maximum medical improvement (MMI)as "a term used to indicate that a
person has reached such a plateau that in the physician's opinion there is no further medical care
or treatment which will lessen the degree of impairment.") However, a finding of MMI does not
necessarily mean that the claimant's disability is completely dissipated. See Swinton v. South
Carolina Dep't of Mental Health, 314 S.C. 202, 442 S.E.2d 215 (Ct. App. 1994).
24. 25A S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 67-504(C) (Law. Co-op. 1990) (emphasis added). Note that
the carrier must also comply with the subsequent subsection (D) of the regulation. Id. Moreover,
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involuntary termination of benefits action in which a claimant refuses to sign
a Form 17, an insurance carrier may petition the Workers' Compensation
Commission for permission to terminate TTD benefits by one of four
methods.' Significantly, Regulation 67-507 does not necessarily require
proof of the claimant's ability to return to work.
In Grayson, the court held that in order for a carrier to properly suspend
TTD benefits, the employer must provide clear proof not only that the
claimant has reached MMI, but also that the claimant "is able to return to
work without restriction."26The regulation gives an employer two options in
showing that an employee is capable of returning to work without restriction:
(1) the employer can provide medical certification that the employee is able to
return to work without restriction; or (2) the employee may agree that he or
she is able to return to work without restriction.2 7
In evaluating whether the employer met the requirements for the first
option in Regulation 67-504, the court held that the proof offered by Carter
Rhoad was insufficient because the doctor's "release" contained words of

when the claimant signs a Form 17, indicating his or her ability to return to work without
restriction, the insurance carrier may terminatebenefits by filing the Form 17 with the Workers'
Compensation Commission's Claims Department. See 25A S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 67-504(D)
(Law. Co-op. 1990) (emphasis added).
25. 25A S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 67-507(C)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1990) states that a carrier can
request a hearing for permission to terminate TTD benefits by attaching one of the following to

a Form 21:
(a) A medical certificate of the authorized health care provider stating the claimant
has reached maximum medical improvement; or
(b) A medical certificate of the authorized health care provider stating the claimant
is able to return to the same or other suitable job, an impairment rating, if any, and
an affidavit of the employer that the same or other suitable job has been provided to
the claimant; or
(c) A medical certificate of the authorized health care provider stating the claimant
is unable to return to the same or other suitable job and an impairment rating; or
(d) A medical certificate of the authorized health care provider stating the claimant
refuses medical treatment.
See also Brown v. Owen Steel Co., 316 S.C. 278, 450 S.E.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994) (finding
that an employer properly terminated TTD benefits by submitting a physician's report that
concluded the claimant had reached MMI).
26. Grayson, _ S.C. at _, 454 S.E.2d at 322.
27. 25A S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 67-504(C) (Law. Co-op. 1990). Regulation 67-502(A)(4)
defines the phrase "return to work without restriction" as:
A statement of the authorized health care provider about the capacity of the
claimant to meet the demands of a job and the conditions of employment. The
determination must be made when the claimant's physical condition is static or is
stabilized with or without medical treatment. The determination is appropriate when
there are no physical limitations on the claimant's ability to perform the same or other
suitable job as the claimant performed before the injury.
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limitation.2" The court seemed to give great weight to the doctor's warning
that Grayson be "somewhat careful with lifting." In fact, the court ultimately
found that such a limitation on a furniture mover negated any argument that
Grayson had returned to work "without restriction."29 The question arises as
to whether Dr. Graziano intended his imprecise words to be construed as a
true restriction or as merely providing cautionary advice to his patient.3"
Moreover, the court seemed to disregard other language in Dr. Graziano's
report indicating that Grayson was "doing fine .

. .

. ha[d] full [range of

motion] and only ha[d] some discomfort with extension." 3' Through its
narrow linguistic interpretation, the court imposed a new, higher standard of
proof, indicating that in order to properly suspend benefits, employers and
carriers must provide specific proof that a claimant has reached MMI and, in
light of the exact verbiage in a doctor's release, is clearly able to return to his
or her particular line of work.
In reviewing the second option under Regulation 67-504, the court found
Grayson's signing of the Form 17 virtually irrelevant and focused instead on
Grayson's testimony.32 Generally, if an employee has signed a Form 17, it
is an acknowledgement that he or she was able to return to work without
restriction.33 Such signature should, therefore, satisfy the proof requirements
for proper TTD suspension under the second option of Regulation 67-504(C).
Moreover, after a claimant has signed a Form 17 the insurance carrier can file
for a voluntary termination of benefits with the Commission.3 4 Yet, in
Grayson, the court rejected the signed Form 17 as sufficient proof to end
benefits. The court found that Grayson never agreed that he was able to return
to work without restriction because his testimony indicated that he was in pain
and could not perform his job as well as he could before the accident.35 In
doing so, the court indirectly suggested that pain and decreased work levels
are sufficient to prevent the termination of TTD benefits. Such a suggestion
conflicts with the purpose of TTD benefits in South Carolina, which is to
compensate for the claimant's loss of earning capacity. Grayson demonstrated
his capacity to earn wages by returning to work for three weeks, and he was
subsequently terminated for reasons unrelated to his injury.

28. Grayson, _ S.C. at _,
454 S.E.2d at 322.
29. Id. at _,
454 S.E.2d at 322.
30. Cf. Ancrum v. Low Country Steaks, _ S.C. _,

452 S.E.2d 609, 610-11 (Ct. App.

1994). The doctor in Ancrum concluded that his own objective medical findings did not support
claimant's subjective complaints, determining that claimant had reached MMI but giving claimant
an impairment rating and telling her not to "lift more than 25 to 30 pounds." Id.
31. Record at 52.
32. Grayson, __

S.C. at

__

n.2, 454 S.E.2d at 322 n.2.

33. See S.C. WCC Form #17.
34. 25A S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 67-504(D) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
35. Grayson,

__

S.C. at __
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Thus, the court apparently found that in a voluntary suspension of benefits
action in which a claimant has signed a Form 17, the employer must provide
either clear proof that the doctor released the claimant without restriction or
that the claimant unquestionably agreed that he or she was able to return to
work without restriction before the employer is entitled to suspend benefits.
Because Carter Rhoad never provided clear evidence that Grayson was without
restriction, the court found that Carter Rhoad could not have properly
terminated Grayson's TTD benefits because it failed to even meet the
preliminary requirements for suspension of benefits under Regulation 67504(C).
However restrictive the employer requirements set forth in Grayson
appear, these standards may only apply to voluntary suspension of benefits
cases where the employee signs a Form 17 pursuant to Regulation 67-504, as
opposed to an involuntary action to terminate benefits brought by an employer
under Regulation 67-507, where the employee refuses to sign a Form 17.36
For example, in O'Banner v. Westinghouse Electric Corp." the court of
appeals clearly rejected the argument that an employer must provide proof of
an employee's ability to return to work before terminating TTD benefits under
Regulation 67-507. In O'Banner, Westinghouse provided a written medical
report stating that the claimant had reached MMI and suffered a 15%
permanent partial disability to his back, thereby satisfying the requirements of
Regulation 67-507(C)(3)(b). 38 The Workers' Compensation Commission
granted Westinghouse's stop-payment application and terminated O'Banner's
TTD benefits. The O'Banner court, emphasizing a clear break from the past,
flatly rejected the claimant's argument that, in addition to proving that the
claimant had reached MMI, Westinghouse was required to provide evidence
of their employee's "ability to return to work" in a medical report.3 9 The
court of appeals agreed that a stop payment was in order and strongly
indicated its unwillingness to impose any additional barrier on employers and
carriers, stating:

36. 25A S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 67-507 (Law. Co-op. 1990); see supra note 25.
37. _ S.C. _, _, 459 S.E.2d 324, 326 (Ct. App. 1995).
38. Id. at __, 459 S.E.2d at 325. Westinghouse did offer a videotape of O'Banner hitting
softballs; however, in determining whether Westinghouse met the requirements of Regulation 67507(C)(3)(b), the court of appeals looked only at the medical report which stated the claimant had
reached MMI. Id. at _,
459 S.E.2d at 326.
39. Id. at -, 459 S.E.2d at 326. The O'Bannercourt distinguished the current requirements
from the former regulation which had been applied inAdans v. Rice Servers, 313 S.C. 488, 443
S.E.2d 391 (1994) (holding that under Regulation 67-10, the predecessor to Regulation 67-507,
in a stop payment action, an employer must prove that the claimant has the ability to return to
work).
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The current [R]egulation [67-507] unambiguously allows the employer to
attach only a medical certificate stating the claimant has reached MMI to
support its stop payment application. We refuse to read into the presumption [of disability] . . . a requirement that the employer provide separate
proof of claimant's ability
to return to work, in addition to the require40
ments of subsection (C).
Thus, the court of appeals held that Westinghouse properly complied with the
procedural requirments to terminate TTD payments, as set forth in Regulation
67-507, by merely providing a doctor's report stating that the claimant had
reached MMI. 4' The fact that the claimant continued to receive prescriptions
did not prevent the court from finding that he had reached such a plateau of
medical improvement that no further medical treatment would lessen the
degree of O'Banner's impairment.42
In light of both Grayson and O'Banner, it is clear that employers and
carriers must comply with different procedures depending on whether they act
under Regulation 67-504 or Regulation 67-507 in seeking to stop TTD
payments. Undoubtedly, Grayson indicates that in a voluntary proceeding to
suspend TTD benefits under Regulation 67-504, an employer must either
provide clear evidence that the claimant has both reached MMI and is able to
return to work or that the claimant agrees that he or she is able to return to
work before the employer can properly suspend benefits. Moreover, if the
employer meets these requirements and further seeks to terminate TTD
benefits pursuant to a signed Form 17 under Regulation 67-504, it appears that
an employer can no longer rely on a claimant's signed Form 17 as conclusive
proof that the claimant agreed he or she was able to return to work. The
court's holding in Grayson, however, does not appear to affect the degree of
medical proof required in an involuntary termination of TTD benefits action
initiated by an employer under Regulation 67-507(C)(3). For an involuntary
termination of TTD benefits, an employer need only provide medical certification that the claimant reached MMI, without any additional proof that the
claimant is able to return to work. Even so, it may be wise for employers and
carriers to request clear statements from medical providers indicating that the
claimant is able to return to work without restriction before suspending or
terminating TTD benefits under either regulation.
Sarah Ellis McKay-

40. Id. at
41. Id. at

459 S.E.2d at 326 (citations omitted).

_,

459 S.E.2d at 325-26.
42. Id. at__, 459 S.E.2d at 327; see also supra note 23 (stating South Carolina's definition
of MMI).
* Much appreciation is extended to Stanford E. Lacy, Esquire, of Collins & Lacy, P.C., an
adjunct Workers' Compensation Professor of the University of South Carolina School of Law,
for his assistance in reviewing the substance of this note.
,
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